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arch 2012, Vol. 25, Issue 2 104Total Cost Electricity Pricing:
A Market Solution for
Increasingly Rigorous
Environmental StandardsThis technology-neutral marginal cost pricing approach
can integrate the private and social costs of electricity
generation. The pricing methodology borrows from the
adders and value-based feed-in tariff literature. When both
social and private costs are considered, the lowest-cost
technology generally (but not necessarily) involves lower
amounts of environmental pollutants.Catherine M.H. Keske, Samuel G. Evans and Terrence IversonI. IntroductionElectricity providers across the
U.S. are challenged to meet
increasingly rigorous
environmental targets, while
keeping energy prices affordable
to customers and delivering
expected returns to shareholder
investments. The purpose of this
article is to present a total-cost
energy pricing approach that can
be used to address these
challenges, and encourage0-6190 # 2012 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-technological innovation in
electricity generation. This is an
example of a market-based
solution that can offer load-
serving entities a flexible bridge
to cost avoidance as they address
increasingly rigorous
environmental targets. The Excel-
based, total-cost pricing tool is
publicly available,1 and the data
reflect previously published
work on the marginal damage
costs of electricity generation in
the U.S.2doi:/10.1016/j.tej.2012.02.004 7NC-ND license.
8II. Study BackgroundBy the mid-1990s,
over half of
all states had
either implemented
an adders
policy or
were considering
doing so.U.S. power plants are facing
increasingly rigorous
environmental quality standards.
For example, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards released in December
2011 now mandate reductions in
power plant mercury emissions.3
The EPA estimates that
approximately 1,400 units at 600
power plants will be affected by
these standards, including
approximately 1,100 existing coal-
fired units and 300 oil-fired units.
The EPA also recently released an
on-line, searchable map and
database of the nation’s
greenhouse gas emitters. This is
expected to increase societal
pressure for power plants to
reduce air emissions.4 EPA
regulations for greenhouse gas
emissions, which are anticipated
to also affect power plant
functionality and costs, are slated
for spring 2012.
S ubstantial capital upgrades toU.S. energy infrastructure are
expected during the next decade.
New plants are being built to
replace outdated technology,
achieve renewable energy
integration, and meet increasingly
stringent environmental
performance targets. As a result,
electricity costs are projected to
rise substantially while the total
retail sale projections are flat.5
There is clearly a need for an
energy pricing policy that rewards
innovation, but provides incentive
to keep costs low, while meeting
energy targets.1040-6190/$–see front matter # 2012 ElsevT his article presents a total-cost electricity pricing
model that more closely reflects
the full social costs of electricity
generation that could be used
either as an alternative to, or in
conjunction with, other legislative
policies in a regulated electricity
market. When total social costs
are calculated, the lowest-cost
technology frequently (but not
necessarily) involves lower
amounts of environmentalier Inc. All rights reserved., doi:/10.101pollutants. One objective of this
article is to provide a practical
illustration of how the private
costs, which are reflected in the
levelized cost of energy (LCOE),
and external costs from
environmental and performance
attributes of electricity
generation, can be combined so
that policymakers can make
informed decisions about the
lowest-cost technologies. The
article uses the state of Colorado
as an example, although the
specific details could be adapted
to include other states. For
example, the proposed total-cost
electricity pricing model could
also be used as part of a lowest-6/j.tecost resource plan, which is a
common approach for public
utilities creating electric resource
plans.6III. Methodology:
Overview of Adders and
Value-Based Feed-in-
Tariff LiteratureThe proposed total cost pricing
methodology is a hybrid
externality-pricing approach that
borrows from the adders and the
value-based feed-in-tariff (FIT)
literature. Environmental adders
incorporate environmental costs
by ‘‘adding’’ or ‘‘subtracting’’
external costs to utility prices.
Interest in adders policies began
in the late 1980s, and by the mid-
1990s, over half of all states had
either implemented an adders
policy or were considering doing
so. Many economists were critical
of the concept,7 though a
respectable minority of policy-
oriented economists saw a
constructive role for adders’
policies.8 However, with energy
deregulation in the late 1990s and
beginning of the new century, the
majority of adders policies were
never implemented. While these
authors laid the groundwork for
adders theory and how to
calculate external costs of
electricity generation,
confounding the matter has been
the absence of a practical
illustration of what the external
costs of electricity generation
might look like.
The methodology in this article
utilizes secondary data toj.2012.02.004 The Electricity Journal
A major
appeal of
an adders
policy is that
it applies
to all
technologies
neutrally.
Mdetermine shadow prices for the
external costs of electricity
generation in a marginal damage
function that is applicable to
Colorado. These are mercury,
carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxide,
sulfur dioxide, and fine
particulate matter PM2.5 levels, as
well as water consumption and
quality. These were selected
because federal and/or state
regulation has either recently
been implemented or is pending
for five of the six. While not a
pollutant, water is a scare
resource in Colorado that can be
consumptively used, disruptively
diverted, thermally loaded, or
otherwise impaired during
electricity generation. Its external
costs are difficult to measure
comprehensively, yet the value of
water is considered much higher
than what has been reflected in
water market prices. To estimate
marginal damage functions, this
report uses published studies
incorporating a range of different
valuation methodologies.
Whenever possible, data are cited
or interpolated to be relevant to
Colorado and conservative
assumptions are chosen in
incorporating them into the
model.9
A dders policies do notdirectly impose costs upon
already established energy
generation sources. Instead, the
adder is applied to new
generation sources or power
generation expansions, thereby
forcing utilities to account for
what would otherwise be external
costs when considering new
sources of energy. By imposingarch 2012, Vol. 25, Issue 2 1040-6190/$–s‘‘shadow prices’’ (i.e., marginal
costs) upon the new sourcing
emissions that exceed certain
targets, the utilities are required
to evaluate alternatives on the
basis of total social cost, equal to
the bid price plus the appropriate
adder. A major appeal of an
adders policy is that it applies to
all technologies neutrally.
Utilities are required to rank
decision options on the basis of
total social cost, but they are freeto choose the best technology to
accomplish this. Since utilities are
not actually charged the adders,
the baseline level is flexible and
can be set according to policy
targets. For example, the adder
could be a sum of the marginal
damages plus the private costs
(i.e., the bid price) for each energy
source. Alternatively, the adder
could be set to zero for the
cleanest energy source, and
adders could reflect differences in
marginal damages between the
cleanest source and the respective
alternatives. Generators with low
operating costs are still financially
rewarded. However, financial
incentives are also provided foree front matter# 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rightsgenerators to achieve
environmental (e.g., mercury
emissions) and performance (e.g.,
consistently available power)
targets. Elements from adders
policies may be effectively
integrated into a hybrid model
that considers the value-based FIT
literature.
FITs are a policy mechanism for
rapidly deploying renewable
energy technologies. Already
popular in Europe, FITs are
gaining attention of U.S.
policymakers and regulators as a
potential alternative or
complement to renewable
portfolio standards and tradable
renewable credit programs. FIT
design varies considerably across
regions; however, the policies
have common features. First, FITs
mandate that utilities purchase
the renewable energy from
eligible sources. Second, FITs
establish a pricing mechanism
that applies to all generators
developing a given technology.10
Two FIT design options have
been explored in detail and
implemented in various global
jurisdictions. The most widely
implemented is the project-cost
approach. In this approach, the
governing institution (usually a
national government) agrees to
pay a set price for a given
technology based on the project’s
costs plus a reasonable rate of
return. This attracts investors by
minimizing price uncertainty
over multi-year contracts. The
project-cost approach has proven
successful in a number of
European countries in developing
renewable capacity. However, thereserved., doi:/10.1016/j.tej.2012.02.004 9
Avoided costs
can include direct
project costs,
environmental
damages, and
undesirable
performance attributes
like intermittency.
10project-cost approach is not
technology neutral, thus violating
a key objective of the policy
design mechanism proposed in
this article. In light of this, it is
more helpful to focus on an
alternative FIT pricing
mechanism known as the value-
based approach.
U nder the value-based FITmethodology, prices are set
to reflect the value to society
provided by electricity
generation. This approach has not
been adopted as extensively as the
project-cost approach, but it has
the potential to achieve
technological neutrality. Value-
based FITs are set according
to a selected baseline technology
and the avoided costs of
generation from a traditional
energy source by working with
that selected technology. Avoided
costs can include (but are not
required or limited to) direct
project costs, environmental
damages, and undesirable
performance attributes like
intermittency.IV. Total Cost PricingThis section outlines how
optimal electricity prices can be
calculated by using a total cost
pricing model. The premise is
based upon lessons learned from
the environmental adders and the
value-based FIT literature. A
more detailed mathematical
representation of the algorithm is
available in the original on-line
published report, and is beyond
the scope of this article.11 Like the1040-6190/$–see front matter # 2012 Elsevalue-based FIT, this algorithm
positively rewards social cost
savings from reductions in
private costs, environmental
damages, and distributional
performance measures. The
pricing formula could be
incorporated into a FIT policy
with an explicit purchase
obligation, or it could simply
be used as a pricing rule to
guide public utility oversight
of new source generationvier Inc. All rights reserved., doi:/10.10contracts. In summary, this
algorithm combines elements of
prior adders policies with
underlying principles of the
value-based FIT in order to
reward power plant providers for
selecting technologies that
comply with increasingly
rigorous environmental
standards.
T he algorithm combinesprivate generation costs
incurred by firms, damages from
environmental externalities, and
utility performance costs to create
a comprehensive cost algorithm
to minimize total social costs. The
hybrid adders/value-based FIT
algorithm minimizes total costs16/j.and rank orders the technology by
the lowest total costs. Total costs
reflect a sum of the private costs
(the LCOE for new builds), plus
the product of the estimated
emissions associated with the
respective technologies times the
calculated marginal damages.12
The marginal damage from
water use is also multiplied by
the quantity of water used and
added to the sum of total costs.
The estimated engineering
emissions values and marginal
damage values associated
with each technology are
available in the on-line
spreadsheet and can be
customized to adjust to
technological innovation that
reduces total emissions.13
To provide a bit more
elaboration, the private
generation costs are the most
straightforward. In a purely
regulated environment, private
costs would be comprised of the
investment and operating costs to
build, run, and maintain a given
facility, alongwith an appropriate
rate of return for investors. In a
competitive situation, private
costs could simply reflect the
winning price from a competitive
bid process. The pricing
algorithm uses KEMA14 values as
the default private costs. It is
important to note that the Excel-
based pricing tool15 also allows
users to ignore the default values
and impute customized private
costs in accordance to their own
source or proprietary data set.
For the purposes of this
blueprint, the environmental
damages are estimated as thetej.2012.02.004 The Electricity Journal
Mmarginal damage for
environmental attributes in the
state of Colorado.16 Utility
performance costs (or integration
costs) capture the increment in
bulk power system operating
costs that would result from
adding a particular generation
technology—typically an
intermittent source or ‘‘variable
power source’’—to the existing
portfolio.17 Integration costs
could also include transmission
and distribution losses that result
from locating a facility in a
particular location. Integration
costs fall on the utility and thus on
customers, so, while they
constitute private costs, they
indeed contribute to social costs.
Due to the complexity of the
existing bulk power system,
integration costs are also difficult
to estimate. Precise calculations
require detailed system modeling
that is beyond the scope of this
article.
I n so far as pricing ruleimplementation, once the
regulator determines the total
social cost per kWh of electricity
for every possible source, the
optimal electricity source can be
determined. Since one does not
want to pay more for a source
then its private cost (and because
it is socially optimal to provide an
adequate price to encourage
generation from the socially
optimal source) the contract price
for the socially optimal source is
its private cost. The private cost
for the social-cost-minimizing
source provides the baseline
against which other technologies
are gauged.arch 2012, Vol. 25, Issue 2 1040-6190/$–seThis could be implemented
using a couple of different
approaches. One approach is that
the contract price for another
source is equal to the baseline,
plus or minus the social value that
would result from generating
electricity from a non-optimal
source. In other words, the
contract price for another
technology would be equal to thebaseline, plus the marginal
damage cost times the
difference in emissions. A
generation source outside of the
optimum should be paid a higher
price to the extent that the
alternative source reduces
environmental damages from
emissions. The reverse approach
could also be taken, in which the
baseline technology could be set
as the technology with the lowest
total social costs, and adders
could be added to adjust for the
subsequent contract prices.
The algorithm is technology
neutral because it prices the
attributes of electricity without
distinguishing the technology
directly—though the result of the
algorithm will favor somee front matter# 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights rtechnologies indirectly, but only
to the extent that they generate
low social costs. In some
instances, the results can be
surprising: the pricing
algorithm may not ‘‘choose’’
the generation technology that
one might be predisposed to
think of as the optimal
alternative. This unbiased
assessment creates incentive to
develop new technologies in line
with stated public interests. In
contrast, renewable energy
standard polices or project-cost
FITs are one-dimensional and
reward a single identified
technology.
An important implication of the
pricing rule is that it only rewards
social-cost-minimizing power
sources. Multiple externalities
and/or integration costs would
subsequently add to the contract
price. In other words, the higher
the total costs, the less
competitive the generation
source.V. Simulation ResultsThe Excel-based total benefit
pricing tool is available online,
with five-step instructions for
operation. To demonstrate the
benefit-pricing tool, seven
technologies have been chosen for
comparison. While care has been
taken to choose values that
appropriately reflect the current
state of technology, users should
note that there is a lot of variation
in these estimates based on factors
such as plant size and
technological design.eserved., doi:/10.1016/j.tej.2012.02.004 11
12The pricing tool parameterizes
the benefit-pricing algorithm as
described in the previous section.
As previously outlined, total
social costs are comprised of
private generation costs,
environmental costs, and variable
power costs.18 The algorithm rank
orders the lowest social cost
technology, based upon the
parameters and energy
technologies selected for
comparison. Although default
cost estimates are provided
for all three cost categories,
based upon the most currently
available scientific literature,
the pricing tool enables
users to impute customized
cost data, to reflect information
and cost updates. In other
words, the pricing tool is both
customizable, as well as
technology neutral.
T wo features of theenvironmental costTable 1: Default Technology Values
Source
Capacity
(MW)
Private
Costs
(LCOE)
($/MWh)
Conventional
combined cycle
500 116.32
Advance
simple cycle
200 282.92
IGCC (coal) 300 98.32
Wind 100 70.19
Hydro- capacity
upgrade
80 65.39
Solar- parabolic
trough
250 238.27
Geothermal- binary 15 93.52
1040-6190/$–see front matter # 2012 Elsecomponent can be customized.
The user can determine which
environmental costs are
considered in the model, as well
as the marginal damage levels.
For an included pollutant, the
user must choose either the lower,
middle, or upper marginal
damage estimates, (or none)
which reflect secondary data
applied to Colorado. By default,
marginal damage estimates are
set to mid-range values. Second,
for each technology the user must
input the relevant emissions
factor for each pollutant. This is a
measure of effluent per unit of
electricity produced. For SO2,
NOx, CO2, PM, and MeHg, the
units must be provided in tons
per megawatt hour of electricity
produced. For water the unit is
acre-feet consumed per megawatt
hour of electricity produced. The
emissions factors for the seven
default technologies have beenEnvironmental Costs (Emission
SO2
(tons/
MWh)
NOx
(tons/
MWh)
CO2
(tons/
MWh)
HeMg
(tons/
MWh)
.000002 .00003 .4195 0
.000004 .00004 .507 0
.000047 .00020 .7295 2.1E9
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
vier Inc. All rights reserved., doi:/10.1016/j.calculated based on various
sources.19
I n summary, the modelcalculates total social cost, a
ranked list of technologies
according to total social cost, and
the social price of each
technology. The Optimal Source
matrix displays social costs for up
to seven energy sources in $/
MWh and cents/kWh. Table 1
shows an applied, simplified
illustration and simulation of the
pricing model using seven
common technologies and default
values. In the Excel workbook,
this scenario can be run by
clicking the ‘‘default scenario’’
button in the pricing algorithm
worksheet.
Figure 1 displays the rank order
of total social costs decomposed
into private cost, environmental
costs, and variable power costs.
Environmental damage values
have been set to reflect medians Factors) Variable
Power Costs
($/MWh)
PM
(tons/
MWh)
Water
(acre ft/
MWh)
.00001 .000675 0
.00003 .000675 0
.00002 .001196 0
0 0 5
0 .038054 0
0 .001074 0
0 .000644 0
tej.2012.02.004 The Electricity Journal
[(Figure_1)TD$FIG]
Source 
Name
Environmental Cost 
($/MWh)
Variable 
Power Cost 
($/MWh)
Total Private 
Cost 
($/MWh)
Total Social Cost 
($/MWh)
Total Social Cost
 (₵ / KWh) 
Optimal Source
Onshore 
Wind - Class 
5
$0.00 $5.00 $70.19 $75.19 7.52
Hydro - 
Capacity 
Upgrate of 
Existing Site
$10.83 $0.00 $65.39 $76.22 7.62
Geothermal -
Binary $0.18 $0.00 $93.52 $93.70 9.37
Coal- IGCC $17.09 $0.00 $98.32 $115.41 11.54
Conventional
Combined 
Cycle 
(Natural Gas)
$9.82 $0.00 $116.32 $126.14 12.61
Solar - 
Parabolic 
Trough
$0.31 $0.00 $238.27 $238.58 23.86
Advanced 
Simple Cycle $11.99 $0.00 $282.92 $294.91 29.49
Non-Optimal 
Sources
Figure 1: Diagram of Total Social Costs
Mestimates. For the simplified
context shown here, onshore
wind turns out to be the socially
optimal technology.
Environmental costs represent
only a small fraction of total social
costs, and they do not
substantially influence the
ranking of sources; a notable
exception is the ranking between
wind and hydro when
consumptive water use is
considered.VI. Summary and
DiscussionThis energy pricing blueprint
demonstrates how social cost
pricing might work in the
regulated utility framework. Thearch 2012, Vol. 25, Issue 2 1040-6190/$–sepreparation of this algorithm has
required an evaluation of the
experiences from other states and
countries, and comes with the
acknowledgement that there is an
extraordinary amount of
complexity with currently
existing policies. Thus, the
implementation of this pricing
rule would require frequent
updating of this data, and more
in-depth modeling. The pricing
rule described is a novel one that
has never been fully implemented
at the state regulatory level. It is
susceptible to many of the same
criticisms that have been leveled
against past policies. Nonetheless,
much of the purpose of this
blueprint is to show how a total-
cost, value-based model might
work and to have the regulatore front matter# 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights rand other stakeholders consider
how it might be used to inform
future rate making and resource
planning in a regulated market
with increasingly rigorous
environmental standards.
O ne example of how themodel could be
implemented might be to attract
funding to generation projects
from suboptimal sources
identified by policymakers as
warranting early-stage subsidies.
As previously discussed, the
algorithm would not provide an
adequate price to attract capital
investments to suboptimal
sources. Instead, it would
typically only support the source
identified as minimizing social
costs. Implementation of the
pricing tool could be necessary toeserved., doi:/10.1016/j.tej.2012.02.004 13
[(Figure_2)TD$FIG]
Figure 2: Illustration of Staged Pricing Schedule (a staged pricing schedule with a
temporary subsidy at PCj can support generation from technologies with identified long
term potential pj)
14include some flexibility to allow
regulators to modify the
algorithm price.
T he simplest approach wouldbe a staged pricing schedule.
This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Under this pricing schedule, the
price would first start at the
source-specific private cost, PCj,
and then fall over time, eventually
dropping to the social-cost-
minimizing algorithm price. Such
a contract would ensure generator
profitability for some initial
phase, but also send a clear signal
that the subsidy is only temporary
and that the source must
eventually be able to compete on
social cost grounds. The length of
the subsidy would have to be
determined by policymakers and
it would naturally depend on the
expected rate of technological
development for the subsidized
source, along with its perceived
future value.
A total-cost pricing approachis technology neutral—it
would link sourcing decisions to
true social costs without favoring
one technology platform over
another. Under the total-cost
pricing mechanism, generators1040-6190/$–see front matter # 2012 Elsewould be financially rewarded for
lowering the environmental costs
that they pass on to society or for
lowering the integration costs that
they pass on to the bulk power
provider—this would be on top of
existing incentives to lower their
own private generation costs. The
mechanism would provide
incentives for electricity
generators to modify existing
operations and to innovate.
These environmental and
performance adders could be
used either as an alternative to, or
in conjunction with, renewable
performance standards or newly
passed power plant regulations.
When combined with private
costs, external costs could yield a
‘‘total cost accounting approach.’’
Depending upon how it is
implemented, a total cost pricing
mechanism could create
incentives to continually improve
upon the environmental and
performance characteristics of
electricity generation, integration,
and even conservation
technologies. Policymakers may
benefit from the experience of
Colorado and from
understanding how marginalvier Inc. All rights reserved., doi:/10.1016/j.damages from electricity
generation may be calculated. In
summary, this value-based
blueprint demonstrates a
methodology for social cost
pricing and how it is possible to
keep both environmental and
economic goals in mind when
creating energy policy.&Endnotes:
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